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Special treatment? Flexibilities in the politics of regenerative medicine’s gatekeeping regimes in the UK 
Abstract 
Emerging flexibilities are apparent in gatekeeping regimes applicable to regenerative medicine products, 
raising issues about the extent to which and forms in which such flexibilities might promote emerging 
products as a sector warranting special treatment, in the context of recent policy developments in the UK and 
wider European Union. Concepts of ‘gatekeeping’, ‘gatekeeping regimes’ and ‘gateways’ can point to the ways in 
which regulatory institutions, health technology assessment organisations, and national planners and purchasers 
of health services together define and control entry to the medical product marketplace and the adoption of 
products into the public healthcare system. Flexibilities in existing regimes and new gateways   are a way of 
maintaining ‘connection’ between gatekeeping regimes and technoscientific innovation in order to steer 
innovation pathways. The gateways concept has affinity with that of Callon’s ‘obligatory passage points’.  A wide 
set of recent policy documents show that the measures promoted exhibit a range of alternative gateways that 
are being constructed around central, legal, restrictive gatekeeping regimes. However, it would be easy to over-
estimate the significance of these developments as relaxations that would favour innovative producers and their 
products on a large scale with wide public health impacts. The concepts of gatekeeping regimes and gateways 
enable understanding of hybrid developments of exceptions and exemptions to dominant regimes which bridge 
across the arenas of market regulation, health technology assessment and healthcare system planning. These 
arenas are being drawn closer together as a means of politically managing stakeholders’ aims in the UK, EU and 
other innovating biomedical health systems globally. 
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Introduction 
The global field of cell-based and tissue-engineered regenerative medicine is diversifying, as a wide range of 
biological mechanisms and therapeutic delivery technologies are developed, tested, trialled and, occasionally, 
introduced into clinical practice. The field is the subject of enormous expectation of its eventual promise to 
revolutionise many areas of medical therapy, including cancer, diabetes, arthritic disease, heart conditions and 
neurodegenerative diseases. It is in effect a nascent sector which many see as deserving special treatment 
through incentives and regulatory concessions in order to promote it. The technical novelty, evidential 
uncertainty and high promise of technologies in the field exacerbate the normal tensions of combining 
facilitation of innovation and limitation and control in medicines regulation (Kennedy, 1978; Faulkner and Kent, 
2001). Regulation can be both enabling and restrictive of scientific innovation and product development, and 
this tension has been exacerbated in the health sector due to the rise of ‘risk regulation’ following various public 
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health safety disasters such as BSE (Vogel, 2001). Different countries have tackled the regulation of these 
sciences, materials and technologies in widely different ways, resulting in a segmented marketplace of different 
regulatory regimes involved in constituting globally the emerging practices and products of the new regenerative 
medicine paradigm.  
An important force shaping the regenerative as well as conventional medicines innovation field is the 
international (‘Western’) policy response to the global slowdown in regulatory approval of new pharmaceutical 
therapies. The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has introduced a ‘fast track designation’ and more 
recently its ‘breakthrough therapy designation’ for drugs able to demonstrate a substantial improvement over 
existing therapies. Both FDA and the European equivalent, the European Medicines Agency are linked partly to 
the ‘New Drugs Paradigms’ (NEWDIGs) international initiative, started in 2010 as a forum for co-ordinating 
and exploring the movement from the dominant binary yes/no boundary-keeping decisions on the market 
authorisation of drugs to a more flexible, stratified approach. Moderated by the MIT Center for Biomedical 
Innovation, the NEWDIGs initiative also involves the UK’s national regulator the Medicines and Healthcare 
products Regulatory Agency (MHRA), Health Canada, the Singapore Health Services Authority as well as 
sponsors, health technology assessment organizations, reimbursers/payers, patient associations and 
academics. The initiative is aimed ‘on enhancing the capacity of the global biomedical innovation system to 
reliably and sustainably deliver new, better, affordable therapeutics to the right patients faster’ (NEWDIGS, 
2016), a ringing endorsement of current political ‘innovation’ agendas. The field is also shaped by massive 
policy actions such as the Innovative Medicines Initiative (IMI) which is Europe's largest public-private 
enterprise, aimed at accelerating the development of safer and improved medicines.  IMI is a joint 
undertaking between the European Union and the pharmaceutical industry association EFPIA and supports 
collaborative research projects and networks across industry and academia (http://www.imi.europa.eu/), 
funded at £3.3 billion in the period 2014-24. There is thus broad pressure globally to reform medicines 
innovation processes and regulation. This pressure is also apparent in the development of the regenerative 
medicine field. 
In the United Kingdom, the last few years have seen a major set of policy initiatives and actions to boost 
the UK’s regenerative medicine activity for both ‘health’ and ‘wealth’ objectives. These initiatives include a 
2011 government ‘Life Sciences Strategy’ and a 2013 House of Lords report on Regenerative Medicine (HoL, 
2013) which proposed a wide range of investments and infrastructural developments specifically to 
promote regenerative medicine as a sector in which the UK would excel on the world stage. The UK’s legal 
regulatory activity in the field of regenerative medicine has been conditioned by its position in the 
European Union and especially, though not exclusively, the Advanced Therapy Medicinal Products 
Regulation of 2007; its (England’s) public healthcare adoption activity is undertaken notably by technology 
assessment-based policy body NICE (National Institute for Health and Care Excellence) and 
commissioning/service contractor NHS England. Both arenas are the site of a range of contests about 
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whether, and if so, how, regenerative medical technologies might be accorded special treatment as a 
sector. A range of sometimes opposing forces of restrictive and pro-innovation politics applies both to the 
arenas of legal regulation of market entry and to the regulation of healthcare commodities’ adoption 
through processes of technology assessment and healthcare payers, which in the UK are called 
‘commissioning’ agencies, who develop contracts with providers such as hospitals for the delivery of 
packages of healthcare to the population.  This paper analyses developments in each of these two 
constituencies, the market/practice entry regulators on the one hand and the healthcare system 
assessment and adoption agencies on the other, in order to pose the questions: to what extent is there 
flexibility in or alongside the existing and emerging dominant central market entry and 
assessment/adoption regimes, what forms do they take, and to what extent do such flexibilities promote 
the emerging regenerative medicine sector? 
Conceptualising regenerative medicine gatekeeping in the UK 
Elsewhere, I have written about the roles of the political negotiation of regulatory categories of different 
medical products as an important dynamic constituting the innovation environment of new medical 
technologies (Zhao, 2005; Faulkner 2009a, 2012c). Conspicuous amongst these is the issue of how legal 
concepts and regulatory institutions can be ‘matched’ to the scientific, technological and industrial 
categories that emerge, or which are produced, in the development and testing of complex new medical 
materials, and how these vary in the framings of different, bounded legal regimes such as national political 
cultures, building on existing regimes.  This key issue has usefully been termed ‘regulatory connection’ 
(Brownsword, 2008).  While laws and regulations are developed as polities and societies try to maintain 
regulatory connection, various forms of institutional gatekeepers wrestle with the technoscientific and 
stakeholder issues that arise at the interface between innovative practices and regulatory concerns. 
This paper develops the concepts of ‘gatekeeping’, ‘gatekeeping regimes’ and ‘gateways’ as a general way 
of combining the assessment for, and policing of, on the one hand the market entry and on the other hand 
the healthcare uptake of new cellular medical products. I adopt these concepts in preference to 
‘regulation’, mostly interpreted to refer to formal statutory law-based gatekeeping, standard-setting and 
guidance, and to ‘governance’, generally taken to refer to looser, network-based, partly distributed forms 
of societal shaping of innovation (Rhodes, 1997). Control over the marshalling and flow of information has 
long been recognised in the sociology of organisational power as a key resource that ‘gatekeepers’ seek to 
deploy (Pettigrew, 1972). Gatekeeping also, more than those related concepts, draws attention to the 
policing of the boundaries of entry of products or services into adoption processes, usership practices and 
the marketplace, and a potential range, to extend the territorial boundary metaphor, of ‘gateways’ through 
which actors and technologies might pass.  
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The family of concepts of gatekeeping using this terminology per se has not been greatly elaborated in 
social science studies of risk-related medical (or other sector) innovation.  I start to develop it in this 
discussion, therefore, in accordance with both common-sense usage and noting its status as part of the 
normal vocabulary of leading international regulatory voices in the medical field (Ehman et al, 2013: 
’regulators are expanding their role to be not only gatekeepers but also enablers of development’(Abstract, 
my emphasis). The notion of regulatory regime (e.g. Scott, 2004), as an institutionalised set of rules, 
practices, expertise and actors accorded special authority in a given sector of society, has become widely 
used, and is connected to the theorisation of the ‘regulatory state’ (Moran, 2001), where command-and-
control government is seen to be shifting toward more diffuse modes of governance in which multiple 
agencies participate in policymaking and implementation, at least in democratic polities. The concept of 
regulatory regime has been used for example in studies of the food sector (Buonanno et al, 2001), 
telecommunications (Bollhoff, 2002) and education (Baxter, 2013).  I therefore adapt this concept to 
understand ‘gatekeeping regimes’ more specifically as sets of rules, practices, knowledges and institutions 
focally concerned with patrolling the boundaries of the emerging regenerative medicine marketplace and 
adoption in healthcare systems through rules of entry. Gatekeeping, therefore, as I use the term here, has a 
role in shaping both technological innovation itself, as well as the innovation pathways that technology 
developers are able to take in attempting to bring products into the marketplace and into healthcare 
practice. Gatekeepers create and work through what can be conceived as gateways to shape emerging 
technological zones or fields, their industrial and scientific actors, emerging markets, their clinical and 
citizen usership, and their rules of engagement (Faulkner, 2009a, 2009b, 2012a). Like regulatory 
connection, ‘gatekeeping connection’ can thus be conceived of as processes by which gatekeepers and 
gateways adjust in order to maintain purchase on the shifting, unstable dynamics of an innovative 
technoscientific field. 
Adopting the concepts of gatekeeping and gateways, Callon’s well known concept of the obligatory passage 
point  (Callon, 1986) is useful to refer to here. The marine biologists in Callon’s well known account of 
scallop fishing in France sought to make themselves into inescapable orchestrators of a campaign by 
defining  the technoscientific problem that other actors would have to agree to in order to advance their 
cause in the case at hand (in this case, ‘how do scallops anchor?’ p8), a process that  Callon called 
problematisation. This problem-defining move can also be aligned with the situation-defining concept of 
agenda-setting (cf. van Merkerk et al, 2006) in an emerging technoscientific field. Although Callon’s seminal 
notion revolved around what was in essence a multi-stakeholder project, I propose that it can also be 
applied to sociotechnical institutions that have achieved the status of the authority to perform gatekeeping 
functions and to define gateways that have become unavoidable for groups of actors or would-be actors in 
a given field. In the case of the gatekeeping constituencies to be considered here, authoritative structures 
are already in existence and given societal legitimation, contested though that status may be. Thus the 
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ability of these actors to assert problem definitions and obtain acquiescence to the rules of the game, is 
less precarious than in Callon’s case, and has become structural and historically embedded in a way that 
cannot be ignored by would-be participants. The gatekeepers that I discuss here are thus able to define the 
problems and maintain their gatekeeping functions, even though as will be shown, they adapt and innovate 
their own rules and methodologies in doing so, thereby mandating a range of more and less formal 
alternative gateways for innovative actors and technologies. In other words, although the gatekeepers’ 
projects can be described as regulatory standardisation in action, this standardising mission encounters 
some powerful and persuasive, and to some extent effective, modification and opposition. 
The last decade has seen the development in Europe of a number of regulatory policy initiatives, including 
some novel gateways for biomedical innovation, that can be seen as relaxations by centralised, mandated 
EU-wide or national gatekeeping actors, under specific conditions, of the basic regulatory frameworks, 
infrastructures, data requirements and dominant technology assessment gatekeeping regimes. This trend 
appears to be increasing as different regimes and their gatekeepers struggle with the dilemmas of 
innovation and potential health benefit that regenerative medicine and its proponents raise. This leads us 
to ask: In what sense might regenerative medicine or cell therapy be framed and constructed in market 
regulation and healthcare system innovation as a special sector or zone deserving of its own gatekeeping 
conventions, its own gateways to markets and health system/clinical adoption, and support systems? How 
do regenerative therapy movements counter and influence the systemic standardisation embedded in 
existing, ‘inherited’ (Stokes, 2012) regulatory regimes?   
To address the question of  the extent, forms and significance of flexibility in dominant gatekeeping 
regimes, the paper analyses recent and current regulatory and gatekeeping strains of policy discourse and 
activity, primarily in the UK and European context. I analyse these trends in terms of the tension between 
commensuration with inherited classificatory domains and technoscientific standards on the one hand 
(Faulkner, 2012b), set against counter-movements of exceptionalism and exemptionalism on the other. I 
show that there is a trend in gatekeeping regimes to create flexibility and alternative gateways to the rules 
of entry to the regenerative medicine marketplace and healthcare systems through various exemptions, 
exceptions and conditional alternative gateways to established paradigms, noting that this flexibility varies 
across different jurisdictions. But I argue that, although indeed the overall effect is one of somewhat 
hybrid, diversifying, imbalanced frameworks, it would be easy to overestimate the extent of these 
developments. In concluding I point to reasons why this is so, and consider the extent to which these 
developments that temper ‘obligatory’ centralised, dominant passage points are able to maintain 
gatekeeping connection and adoption pathways for regenerative medicine innovations.  Table 1 
summarises the range of developments that I discuss in the paper, differentiating conceptually between on 
the one hand legal, regulatory gatekeeping of market entry, and on the other hand alternative and 
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conditional gateways to healthcare adoption, with a category of hybrid, overlapping, conditional gateways 
in between. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Following a brief description of data sources, I tackle first the 
gatekeeping regimes around entry of products into the marketplace and usership (Faulkner, 2009b), and 
then move on to consider the specific case of exceptionalism in the UK’s national methodologies and 
institutional practices in evaluating, guiding, and adopting regenerative medical technologies, in the 
context of the national healthcare system (NHS), which remain under debate at the time of writing 
(Autumn 2016). I then discuss current moves to bridge the gap between market entry gatekeeping and 
healthcare system adoption gatekeeping, and conclude by commenting on the significance of the trends 
surveyed and on the applicability of the conceptual apparatus elaborated in the paper. 
Method 
The paper draws on former and current ESRC supported research projects, which had university research 
ethics committee approval. These involved extensive document collection, interviewing by research teams 
of a wide range of stakeholders, and attendance at policy related meetings from 2013 to 2015.  The 
discussion here refers primarily to a range of data sources in the form of published documents, regulations, 
laws, policy statements, expert commentaries and the like, which are in the public domain. It should be 
noted that exact product and company names often cannot be presented, because this information is 
confidential to the gatekeepers in question primarily for commercial reasons.  
Gatekeeping the marketplace 
Gatekeeping of entry of medical products to the EU (and thus in principle the UK) marketplace rests 
primarily on pharmaceutical and Advanced Therapy Medicinal Product (ATMP) law, operational since 2001 
and 2007-8 respectively. Here I discuss the exceptions and exemptions, the alternative gateways, that have 
been introduced with the gatekeeping regime comprising relevant Directives and Regulations (which I do 
not detail legalistically here), and related measures. Substantively, the key gatekeepers, representing the 
dominant gatekeeping regime are the central European Medicines Agency, and since 2007 (see below) the 
Committee for Advanced Therapies, a specialist committee dealing with regenerative products of various 
types (see below, and Table 1). These institutions assemble multidisciplinary scientific expertise to evaluate 
products presented to them by manufacturers, to classify them, and to make decisions about market 
authorisation based on detailed preclinical and clinical data dossiers. A small number of products have 
been classed as ‘ATMPs’ over the last decade, including for example Holoclar® the first such product to 
contain stem cells, indicated for treating moderate to severe limbal stem cell deficiency (LSCD) due to 
physical or chemical burns to the eye in adults, and ChondroCelect®, the first ATMP approved centrally in 
Europe, a ‘tissue-engineered’ cell-based product indicated for repair of symptomatic cartilage defects of 
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the knee joint. In the UK, the equivalent tasks of assessment and policing are undertaken by the Medicines 
and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) which also inspects manufacturing premises and 
assesses the expertise of production managers (‘Qualified Persons’ (QPs)) at medical products 
manufacturing sites. At the time of writing no UK-originated regenerative products have been approved as 
ATMPs through the centralised EU process. 
In the EU, applicable to pharmaceutical products and thus in principle regenerative medicines, three main 
‘licensing flexibilities’ intended to improve developers’ incentives have already been introduced. First, one 
such regulation-relaxing development that has emerged for products designated as medicines is the 
conditional approval – essentially a leap-frogging of Phase 3 studies (scaled-up studies in patients) and 
launching of a Phase 4 study (final phase of study required) once a product has been marketed. Proponents 
argue that this might speed up bench to bedside translation by approving technologies with less than 
complete safety and efficacy data. However, one analysis suggests that approval times are not necessarily 
shortened (Boon et al, 2010). The procedure is applicable when there is a complete pharmaceutical and 
pre-clinical data package and an almost complete set of clinical data, if it is considered that the remaining 
data will be collected in a short timeframe. To qualify, a product must be intended for treatment, 
prevention or diagnosis of a seriously debilitating or life-threatening disease; have designated ‘orphan’ 
status (meaning that it is intended to treat rare or ultra-rare disease); or be intended for use in emergency 
situations, responding to European Community or WHO recognised unmet medical needs, and immediate 
availability is likely to outweigh risks. Conditional Marketing Authorisations (MAs) must be renewed 
annually.  It is notable that 10%-20% of all drug approvals are now conditional MAs, including in oncology 
about two approvals per annum since the mid-2000s.  
Second, Exceptional Circumstances Licensing is available when comprehensive data could never be 
provided, for example because the disease is too rare, the scientific knowledge is too limited, or because of 
ethical issues such as constraint on submitting seriously ill patients to extensive tests. Third, Accelerated 
Assessment is designed to meet the expectations of patients and to take account of the increasingly rapid 
progress of science and new therapies. It applies to medicinal products supported by major interest from 
public health and therapeutic innovation perspectives. Application for an accelerated assessment 
procedure must justify itself on these grounds. The European Medicine Agency (EMA)’s Committee for 
Medicinal Products for Human Use (CHMP) makes a decision based on the justifications presented and 
recommendations of independent rapporteurs. These early access pathways are not mutually exclusive. 
(The above two paragraphs draw on Mittra et al, 2014 and EMA, 2016). 
These flexibilities are now being recast in terms of a movement toward so-called adaptive approaches.  In 
March 2014 the EMA launched an adaptive licensing programme, inviting companies to participate in a 
pilot project (Ranson & Cline 2014). However, in 2013 the European Commission had stated that it was ‘not 
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convinced’ that adaptive licensing was the best way forward (cited in Ranson & Cline, 2014). The European 
Commission’s IMI initiative (see above) is currently attempting to consolidate these and other apparent 
regulatory easings under the umbrella concept of MAPPS (Medicines Adaptive Pathways to Patients). 
EMA’s Senior Medical Officer Eichler has preferred the term ‘adaptive pathways’, indicating a less legalistic 
and softer, provisional (conceptually hybrid, see Table 1) approach to flexible gatekeeping that arguably 
lessens the financial risk for producers (Eichler, 2015). EMA’s intended adaptive pathways initiative 
amounts to an umbrella policy approach that would integrate a number of elements, especially related to 
non-conventional data requirements, such as adaptive clinical trial design, patient centric benefit/risk 
assessments and the continuous evaluation of a therapy as new evidence ‘including real world evidence’ 
(meaning from patient registries or patient cohort studies without control groups) becomes available.  
Interestingly in the context of debate about the role of consumer/patient demand for therapies, the 
initiative includes an acknowledgment of patient access issues as part of a life cycle approach to the 
innovation process. The ‘expected impact’ would be:   
a comprehensive plan of development and exploitation of tools, methodologies, infrastructures 
that will allow changes in R&D, regulatory and medical practice to enable early patient access to 
innovative prevention and treatment options (IMI, 2014) 
In the UK case, a research report following on from the House of Lords’ recommendations (HoL, 2013) 
examined such perceived requirements to facilitate commercialisation, funding and reimbursement 
(Omidvar et al, 2014).  Similar issues of access and methodology are being debated elsewhere in the 
context of RM commercialization.  For example, in Canada at a recent ‘Business of Regenerative Medicine 
course’, in Toronto, in July 2014 reimbursement and accelerated approval were debated  
There was particular excitement around accelerated approval regulatory pathways that are being 
developed to facilitate the commercialization of live cell technologies. As (a CEO of a company) put 
it, we’re experiencing a “magical era of accelerated approval.” But he also wonders about the fate 
of cell therapy technologies upon approval, and what is being done to link accelerated approval 
with reimbursement.  (Curtis, 2014) 
(The latter point about reimbursement is discussed further in the section on ‘Gatekeeping clinical and 
healthcare adoption’ below). Alongside pharmaceutical exceptionalism must be set certain exemptions 
from the dominant centralised European market entry gatekeeping that have been introduced in the 2007 
ATMP Regulation. On November 13th, 2007, the European Union adopted a lex specialis on medicinal 
products based on genes, cells and tissues: Regulation (EC) No 1394/2007 on advanced therapy medicinal 
products (the ‘ATMP Regulation’). This was a new category of medicinal product established by the law, 
which covers many, though not all products deemed to be regenerative medicine products. The Regulation 
applies to products either ‘prepared industrially’ or ‘manufactured by a method involving an industrial 
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process’. This definition implied that some therapies would be deemed to be produced non-industrially,  
and thus a so-called ‘hospital exemption’ was constituted, which means that medicinal products not falling 
under centralised EU regulation by EU law would not benefit from a harmonized regime across the 
European Union marketplace, though they have to respect national laws (Mahalatchimy et al, 2012) 
The ATMP Regulation institutes provision for a central and unique marketing authorization at the European 
Medicines Agency (EMA) level where a new Committee for Advanced Therapy (CAT) was created, meaning 
that once authorized, products may be made available throughout the EU member states. Four types of 
biological medicinal products were defined as ATMPs: gene therapy medicinal products (GTMP), somatic 
cell therapy medicinal products (CTMP), tissue engineered products (TEPs) and combined ATMPs which 
combine a medical device (legal category) with an advanced therapy. This is therefore the dominant 
gatekeeping paradigm for regenerative medicinal products in the European Union.  
The EMA through the Committee for Advanced Therapies can provide an informal scientific 
recommendation on the classification of products, and this has emerged as one its primary activities. 
Unsurprisingly, there are difficulties in distinguishing products which are covered and products which are 
not by the definition of industrial process. The European Commission has tried to clarify it as follows: 
This should cover, inter alia: Any “mass production” of advanced therapy products for allogeneic 
use (batch production, “off the shelf” products etc.); any advanced therapy product for autologous 
use (i.e. using cells/tissues from a single patient and re-implanting after manipulation) which, 
although being patient-specific by definition, is manufactured in accordance with a standardised 
and industrial process.  
This distinction is crucial to defining the status and responsibilities of producers of regenerative products, 
whether in hospitals or in the commercial sector. Thus the Hospital Exemption has emerged as an 
alternative, national-level gateway to clinical application, and is one of the most controversial features of 
the Regulation and its implementation in different EU member states. In fact, the proposal of this measure 
was controversial from the start. An internal EU document noted the differing views about the new 
principle:  
products prepared in a pharmaceutical enterprise not under this exemption would require clinical 
trials…but similar products prepared for the same use under the exemption (i.e. in a hospital for a 
single patient) would not (Council of European Union, 2007)  
The shift in the Commission strategy toward advanced therapies thus brought with it a shift to a new 
principle in which the mode and locus of production has become dominant. The new organising principle 
rests on matters in particular of the scale of activity and the industrial, repetitive or nonroutine nature of 
the enterprise.  Here we see a central gatekeeping attempt to define a borderline between capitalist 
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commodity market and non-market forms of the technical practice of tissue and cell therapy, typically, 
though not straightforwardly, institutionalised in the distinction between hospitals and commercial 
enterprises (and leaving aside such difficult issues as the fact that there is no legal definition of a hospital in 
EU law, and that the legal entities which constitute healthcare providers vary greatly across the EU). 
However, it should be noted that the Hospital Exemption has only been given to one manufacturing site in 
the UK at the time of writing, possibly because most clinical applications to date involve transport of 
materials across national borders, which is not allowed under that scheme – unlike an alternative gateway, 
the so-called ‘Specials’ scheme (see below). 
In UK law, the MHRA has provided guidance on what constitutes non-routine preparation of a product 
(MHRA, 2010). Two main areas are taken into account: First, is it the same product repeatedly under 
consideration? Second, what is the scale and the frequency of the preparation of the specific product? The 
MHRA has also developed guidance on the UK’s arrangements under the hospital exemption scheme 
(MHRA, 2010). This sets up specific standards as regards good manufacturing practice (GMP) and quality, 
pharmacovigilance, traceability, reporting requirements, sanctions and penalties, requirements in respect 
of wholesale dealers, and requirements not specified within the Regulation but which will apply under the 
exemption in the UK such as labelling, package leaflet requirements and advertising (Mahalatchimy et al 
2012). 
It is known that different member states in the EU interpret and apply the hospital exemption in different 
ways and are creating different criteria to define industrial and repetitive production. It has also become 
clear that some developers/producers see this as an attractive option, and the EMA has expressed concern 
that the exemption not be over-used in terms of numbers of individual patient applications -thus distorting 
the marketplace for commercialised products - nor that member states fail to apply analogous safety 
criteria to the production processes and resulting therapies. EMA’s concern also includes both market 
distortion and the safety specifically regarding stem cell products (EMA, 2010).  
Alongside the hospital exemption, the UK had previously created a pharmaceuticals ‘Specials’ scheme 
under 2001  European Union pharmaceuticals legislation which provides: ‘A Member State may, in 
accordance with legislation in force and to fulfil special needs, exclude from the provisions of this 
(medicines) Directive medicinal products supplied in response to a bona fide unsolicited order, formulated 
in accordance with the specifications of an authorised health-care professional and for use by an individual 
patient under his direct personal responsibility’. For such products, no product licence or marketing 
authorisation is required, but a manufacturer’s (Good Manufacturing Practice -GMP standards) licence is 
required. Under this scheme, doctors and certain other prescribers can commission an unlicensed relevant 
medicinal product to meet the special needs of individual patients. (Mahalatchimy et al, 2012). The MHRA 
does not publish the names of products regulated as Specials or under ATMP hospital exemption; in 
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contrast, in Germany to give one example,  it is reported that a personalised immune therapy for certain 
brain cancers, DCVax-L ® produced by U.S company Northwest Bio, has been approved under hospital 
exemption; this product, coincidentally, was also the first product to be given a ‘Promising Innovative 
Medicine’ designation by the MHRA in the UK (see section below on ‘Gatekeeping clinical and healthcare 
adoption’). 
The role of the Committee for Advanced Therapies (CAT) continues to evolve, partly in interaction with 
other perceived stakeholders. For example, in a summary of its work programme from 2010, its Chair 
mentioned its role as including: ‘a joint conference on ATMPs involving EMA/CAT, EFPIA, EBE, EUROPABIO 
(the latter three are trade associations) (and) Learned Societies to share clinical, scientific and regulatory 
expertise in the field for the benefit of all stakeholders’ (Schneider 2014; author was Chair of CAT). This 
statement was presented at an EMA conference on regulatory science ‘Regulatory science: are regulators 
leaders or followers?’ in 2010. Gatekeepers also appear willing to explore innovations in regulatory science 
that would enable good quality in vitro data to play a greater role in early stage proof of concept and safety 
(Mittra et al, 2015). Other CAT initiatives were to consider whether to: ‘Extend incentives for SMEs to 
academia, hospitals, trusts and small research groups?’; and to ‘’Promote access and availability for 
patients’: ‘Consult (with national regulators) on hospital exemption’; ‘Encourage development of ATMPs for 
unmet medical needs without alternative treatments’. The performance of the ATMP Regulation was 
subjected to public consultation during 2014, and these issues figured prominently in critical comments 
submitted (European Commission Health and Consumers Directorate-General, 2015). Criticism of the 
hospital exemption, insufficient adaptation to particular characteristics of regenerative products, and the 
lack of special incentives for academia and hospitals, emerged especially strongly from this public 
stakeholder consultation. 
 
Another alternative to the dominant obligatory passage point or gateway of centralised 
pharmaceutical/ATMP gatekeeping is, arguably, designation of a new cell technology as a medical device. 
This is seen by some developers as a less stringent route in Europe for RM products, compared to the 
pharmaceutical route. In the EU medical device market assessment is made by devolved ‘notified bodies’ 
which are specialist technical centres with particular expertise in different types of devices. Products are 
given a classification according to the deemed level of physical health risk. This can be a realistic and crucial 
consideration for developers, because the ‘primary mode of action’ of given technologies is by no means 
always clear-cut, and indeed is one of the aspects that regulators such as the Committee for Advanced 
Therapies regularly adjudicates on.  Thus for example the rise of ‘closed system’ centrifuge technologies in 
which a patient’s cells are processed within a single operative procedure to isolate ‘regenerative cells’ (for 
example, producers Cytori; Regeneus), which may include adult/mesenchymal stem cells, are regulated as 
medical devices. 
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So there are a range of political developments in the gatekeeping regime designed to allow potentially 
beneficial innovative technologies to be used to a greater or lesser degree, under various conditions, in 
some cases prior to full marketing authorisation. As has been noted, some of these are mandated within 
legal/regulatory frameworks, whilst others are not. The regulatory policy initiatives are summarised in 
Table 1’s left-hand and middle columns.  These political developments evident in the policy discourse that I 
have analysed introduce and apply alternative gateways that make the overall gatekeeping regime more 
flexible for participating actors. Their ‘adaptive’ nature can usefully be understood as a means of 
maintaining connection between the gatekeeping regime and the ever-evolving and regulation-challenging 
technoscientific field in question. 
 
<Table 1 about here> 
 
Gatekeeping clinical and healthcare adoption  
In this section, I consider the policy discourse and activity of recent discussions and developments in the 
MHRA, NICE (National Institute for Health and Care Excellence) and NHS England, the National Assembly for 
Wales, and high-level Regenerative Medicine Expert Group meetings during 2014 (in which the author 
participated), which was formed on the recommendation of a 2013 House of Lords Science & Technology 
Committee report on RM. The modus operandi of the MHRA has been noted above (introduction to 
‘Gatekeeping the market’ section); NICE is England and Wales’ national central health technology 
assessment agency, evaluating and making decisions about the acceptability of new drugs and devices for 
the public National Health Service, in the context of existing technologies and standards of care. It produces 
legally mandated Technology Appraisals based on extremely detailed quantitative and statistical re-
evaluations of all relevant studies of clinical and cost-effectiveness of particular technologies and a wide 
variety of other recommendations, guidance and clinical guidelines on specific medical conditions and 
health service areas. This work is undertaken through a variety of multidisciplinary expert committees, its 
own technology assessment staff, and contracted-out technical assessment agencies. It largely applies a 
utilitarian philosophy of maximum benefit to the population, hence the principles of health economics in 
making technology assessment decisions using the QALY methodology (see below) are to the fore.  
NHS England (NHSE) is the purchaser of national level Specialised Services (for example for some cancers) 
where national-level planning is deemed necessary, and negotiates policies in particular medical service 
areas which are then ‘commissioned’ by regional bodies (currently called Clinical Commissioning Groups). It 
is charged with implementing the results of NICE’s Technology Appraisals. NHSE conducts some its own 
technology assessments collecting and reviewing available clinical study evidence, where NICE has not done 
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so, and operates with advice from expert clinical specialists arranged in Clinical Reference Groups.  Again, I 
focus on the apparently relaxative exceptions and exemptions that appear as alternative gateways being 
created in and around the dominant obligatory passage points of gatekeeping associated with the 
structures, organising categories and methodologies of these institutions, and the contested positions, 
interests and methodologies around them. 
In the UK, one of the schemes now being embraced under the MAPPS (Medicines Adaptive Pathways to 
Patients) concept referred to above is the ‘Early Access to Medicines Scheme’ (EAMS) (MHRA 2014), which 
was instigated in the government’s 2011 new Strategy for Life Sciences. This scheme ‘aims to give patients 
with life threatening or seriously debilitating conditions access to medicines that do not yet have a 
marketing authorisation when there is a clear unmet medical need’. Subsequently, a new special 
designation has been created for promising products: ‘Promising Innovative Medicine’ (PIM). A PIM 
designation, awarded by the MHRA, is a necessary first step in, and increases the likelihood of a company 
being able to achieve a positive scientific opinion for formal Early Access status for its product, thus making 
it available, pre-licensing, to patients. Regenerative medicine products are within the scope of the scheme: 
as the MHRA website proclaimed in November 2014: ‘MHRA awarded the first PIM designation for a cell 
therapy product for the treatment of cancer on 8 September 2014.’ (The treatment is for glioblastoma, but 
the names of the product and company are not in the public domain). PIM designation refers to: 
 Promising Innovative Medicine’ and ‘will give an indication that a product may be eligible for the 
Early Access to Medicines Scheme (based on early clinical data). The PIM designation will be issued 
after an MHRA scientific meeting and could be given several years before the product is licensed 
(MHRA 2014).  
The scheme is distinct from the adaptive licensing discussed above which operates within existing market 
authorisation law, and mandates the producer to provide the therapy outside the marketplace, at no cost 
until licensing is achieved. The scheme has been supported by the British government in consultation with 
trade associations and other interested parties during 2014, in response to earlier stakeholder 
consultations by MHRA and the Department of Health (UK Government, 2014). The scheme explicitly 
addresses ‘the landscape for early access to medicines which reflects the UK Life Sciences Strategy and NHS 
Innovation Health and Wealth reforms’, and ‘Reflects the profound changes driven by Genomics, Data, and 
the rise of Stratified and Personalised Medicines’ (ibid, p3). Notably also, patient group involvement is 
explicitly recognised in the early adoption process: ‘Encourages startups, patient groups and charities to 
collaborate within the extensive infrastructure via the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) funded 
Clinical Research Facilities and Biomedical Research Centres and Units in leading NHS Trust/university 
partnerships’.  The government response also mandates for ‘a newly coordinated NICE technology appraisal 
and NHS England Commissioning process’.   
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The first product to be accorded full EAM status within the legal framework was announced in early 2015: 
Pembrolizumab, a monoclonal antibody produced by US company Merck: ‘a positive scientific opinion has 
been awarded for a medicine used to treat advanced melanoma’ (MHRA CEO Hudson, March 2015). While 
not a regenerative medicine itself, this development nevertheless strengthens the viability of this 
alternative gateway, to which a PIM-designated product may be promoted.  The data requirements for the 
EAMS scheme are less onerous than the full marketing authorisation application dossier which would 
otherwise be required: ‘The trigger for an Early Access to Medicines scientific opinion does not necessarily 
have to be the submission of a dossier for marketing authorisation application, but the availability of a 
sufficiently compelling case based on the total data and evidence collected to date as assessed by the 
MHRA’ (MHRA, 2014). While the Early Access Scheme is operated by the market-entry gatekeeper the 
MHRA, it requires coordination with NICE and NHS England as the commissioner of health services, 
including especially NHSE’s Specialised Services (NHSE, 2012). NHSE’s Specialised Services strategy is to 
have a ‘clear focus on a range of rare conditions and low volume treatments ranging from medical genetics, 
kidney disorders and uncommon cancers to complex cardiac interventions, burn care and some specialised 
services for children’ (NHSE, 2012). The rationale for this set of services is thus to provide services for 
relatively rare medical conditions with severe effects, and may thus apply to regenerative products. 
The potential for tensions and potential non-alignment between the two forms of gatekeeping that I have 
been discussing here (noted also in the section above) is high. There are examples of market-authorised 
products with regenerative claims, which have not been authorised by national HTA bodies such as NICE in 
the UK. Short of HTA negative opinions, there are examples of national HTA processes resulting in requests 
to a manufacturer of a cell therapy product to undertake more research to address particular information 
deficits. An example of this decisional route from NICE is ReCell ™ a spray-form product for burn injuries: 
‘The medical technology guidance on the ReCell Spray-On Skin system for treating skin loss, scarring and 
depigmentation after burn injury recommends further research. This recommendation is not intended to 
preclude the use of the technology in the NHS but to identify further evidence.’ (NICE, 2014). Such policy 
positions clearly attempt to steer a course between commercial interests, clinician decision-making, and 
national system-level evidence appraisal. 
NICE was strongly represented in a Regenerative Medicine Expert Group (RMEG) during 2014, constituted 
to advise the British government on policy to support RM as a sector following the Life Science Strategy and 
the House of Lords report referred to above (HoL, 2013). RMEG membership has been composed of a wide 
range of stakeholders including big pharma, SMEs, clinicians, NICE and NHS England policy staff, private 
health insurers, charitable funders, disease-based patient representative organisations, and social 
scientists. Its work was arranged into three groups, focused on Delivery, Regulation & Licensing, and 
Evaluation & Commissioning (a NICE official was made Chair of the latter group). One recommendation was 
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to create a high level Ministerial Strategy Group for regenerative medicine (paralleling existing groups for 
medical technology and pharmaceuticals), however, this proposal was rejected by the Minister for Health. 
The overall tenor of the RMEG discussions about technology appraisal of regenerative medicines was that 
the existing methodology (including QALYs,1 clinical evidence and cost effectiveness analysis, etc.) was 
adequate and was already applied successfully to other innovative medicines. However, the following 
potentially concessionary proposal was agreed, stated to be initiated by NICE and endorsed by RMEG : 
 to undertake one or two ‘mock’ technology appraisal studies, on exemplar regenerative medicine 
products. Such studies could include T cell therapies where there are a number of products in 
development.  (RMEG Report, 2015) 
Alongside NICE, as national commissioner of health services NHS England undertakes some technology 
assessments that NICE does not undertake, and contracts with providers in order to secure services for the 
population, including the aforementioned Specialised Services.  Alternative payment or reimbursement 
schemes for innovative technologies were also widely debated.  The RMEG report discussed pros and cons 
of ‘risk-sharing’ schemes between NHSE and local commissioners and commercial technology providers 
(payments related to ongoing patient outcomes evaluation), noting their drawbacks, and refers more 
positively to NHSE’s recent ‘Commissioning through Evaluation’ (CtE) scheme, which is applied to a limited 
number of therapies, and which enables HTA assessment to be undertaken while a technology is 
introduced in a limited number of sites. The RMEG concludes on this issue with a very general, flexible 
recommendation, simply that ‘an innovative business model’ should be developed (RMEG, 2015). 
NHSE had set up a working group on regenerative medicine in response to the House of Lords report. The 
following recommendation also is made in the RMEG report, to strengthen this cross-cutting initiative: 
the cross CRG (Clinical Reference Group) working group for regenerative medicine set up by NHS 
England to support RMEG should be further developed into a formal ‘CRG for regenerative 
medicine’. It should include clinicians covering a wide range of specialisms and experience in 
regenerative medicine to provide specific insight and advice on regenerative medicine products to 
other CRGs and NHS England. (RMEG, 2015) 
Another possible relaxation is ‘value-based assessment’ (VbA). This is a methodological HTA/NICE 
development which arguably extends the possibilities for RM products becoming adopted in the NHS, 
especially because many of these products promise long-term benefits, that may not easily be captured by 
existing methodologies. The VbA concept had been partially developed by NICE following extensive 
                                                          
1
 QALY = Quality-adjusted Life Year, ‘A measure of the state of health of a person or group in which the benefits, in 
terms of length of life, are adjusted to reflect the quality of life. One QALY is equal to 1 year of life in perfect health. 
QALYs are calculated by estimating the years of life remaining for a patient following a particular treatment or 
intervention and weighting each year with a quality of life score. ‘ (NICE definition) 
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consultation, highlighting a high degree of uncertainty around the definition of the concept. It is currently 
unclear if or how this will be incorporated into NICE’s assessment methodologies and organisational 
infrastructure, and how closely it would be tied to, or equated to, the QALY methodology (NICE, 2014 ). In a 
former incarnation, the intention was to develop value-based pricing, whose three dimensions identified  
for methodological development were: ‘burden of illness’, ‘therapeutic improvement’ and ‘wider societal 
benefits’: 
…we intend to consider the wider impact of a disease on people's ability to be part of society. We 
refer to this as the ‘wider societal impact’ and define it as the loss (or shortfall) in a person’s 
capacity to engage with society as a result of living with the disease or condition, compared with 
their capacity to engage with society without the condition. We propose calculating wider societal 
impact by measuring the absolute shortfall in QALYs (NICE Consultation, 2014: 7) 
The tension between existing methodology and the new proposals is evident here (in the proposal to retain 
the QALY method as the basis for wider societal impact assessment rather than population health status 
and longevity). Attempting to reinforce the extension of QALYs, later in the document we see: ‘Since loss of 
good health affects a person’s ability to engage in society, societal shortfall can be assessed by measuring 
the absolute QALY loss’ (p11). Nevertheless, if this methodological innovation were to be implemented, it 
would imply a widening of the goal-posts or oiling of the hinges of the gateway controlling products’ entry 
into the UK healthcare marketplace, by extending the criteria of assessment. In principle VbA thus means 
that a broader, social-good oriented approach to valuing technologies could be used, an example, crudely 
speaking, being the inclusion in gatekeeping evaluations of potential knock-on effects of a technology on 
return-to-work of previously incapacitated patients, with its consequent calculable impact on the economy. 
However, the development of VbA stalled on this point, partly under criticism that it would operate in an 
ageist way, favouring for example formal economic activity over informal, less calculable caring. 
A further exceptional gateway by which novel technologies that have been approved for the marketplace 
but not for national commissioning is the Individual (Patient) Funding Request, which is available to 
individual clinicians in cases of exceptional need (IFRs in NHS England; IPFRs in NHS Wales). This is a further 
route that has recently attracted policy attention in the UK. NHS England has introduced a requirement that 
should five such requests be received for the identical therapy, then a national policy should be created for 
commissioning the technology as part of a clinical service at one or more provider centre. The Welsh 
government recently reviewed the implementation of this practice too, resulting in a new, more 
coordinated policy. The system will apply to the so-called orphan and ultra-orphan medicines and 
treatments for patients with rare diseases (Welsh Government, 2014), a designation that many developers 
of RM products are known to be seeking. 
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Thus, as with ‘Gatekeeping the marketplace’, a range of apparent easings and potential easings in the form 
of alternative gateways to the dominant centralised regimes, appear to be being introduced in gatekeeping 
of healthcare adoption processes and systems too. These are summarised in Table 1’s right-hand and 
middle columns. In the same way, these innovations in the healthcare gatekeeping regime represent 
systemic adaptations to the pressures produced by innovative regenerative medicine products and their 
proponents. The political adaptations in the gatekeeping regime should be seen as attempts by policy 
actors to maintain what I have termed gatekeeping connection between the institutions and epistemic 
cultures of the healthcare system, and the challenges produced by the innovating technoscientific field. 
Discussion 
Reviewing the developments outlined above, we note that not all the regulatory easing and gateway 
construction that we witness is specific to regenerative medicine or cell therapy, although as I have pointed 
out there are some developments distinctive to the RM sector.  Table 1. summarises in its middle column 
the range of ‘hybrid’ alternative gateway schemes that I have described, and which are proliferating, being 
designed to overlap the market authorisation on the one hand, and healthcare assessment and adoption 
gatekeeping arenas on the other. As one would expect in the case of technoscientific developments of high 
uncertainty and high promise, the volume of political debate and conflicting interests in the regenerative 
medicine field is massive as this paper illustrates. The actors and institutions erecting and organising the 
gatekeeping regimes could have maintained stricter, more centralised, less flexible forms, so it is clear that  
some conditional concessions and participative approaches between stakeholders have become part of the 
gatekeeping system. 
The forms that the regenerative medicine policy and debate takes includes not only the mushrooming of 
working groups and conflicting interest group forums around the legal/regulatory issues, but also the 
tension at least in the UK between an attempt to align regenerative medicine’s market gatekeeping with 
the existing HTA-based regime focused nationally around NICE on the one hand, and the proliferation of 
policy-oriented multi-stakeholder working groups such as the Regenerative Medicine Expert Group on the 
other. There are escalating calls for increasing dialogue between market regulators and HTA actors such as 
NICE and payers such as NHS England more widely in regenerative medicine stakeholder communities. In 
the UK, there are currently moves to create closer coordination between NICE and the MHRA and between 
NICE and NHS England. Such links between the two gatekeeping arenas that I have discussed above may be 
increasing more in some jurisdictions than others. In fact the EMA since 2010 has offered parallel scientific 
advice with HTA bodies to attempt to allow medicine developers to establish the required evidence base, in 
a process sometimes termed ‘parallel review’.  A draft best practice guidance for EMA-HTA parallel 
scientific advice was published for public consultation in May 2014 (EMA, 2014), and we can note that a 
form of ‘parallel review’ was adopted by Health Canada and the Canadian Agency for Drugs and 
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Technologies in Health for all new drugs in late 2012. These developments closing the gaps between the 
gatekeeping regimes of the regulatory and healthcare system adoption domains can be seen as ‘hybrid’ 
forms gatekeeping, as shown in the middle column of Table 1. 
The importance of this tension seen in cases of disjunction between market authorisation gatekeeping and 
healthcare adoption gatekeeping, can instructively be compared to cognate developments in other parts of 
the world.   In South Korea for example, a country that has been progressive with approval of regenerative 
medicine products, regulators hadapproved 16 therapies to 2014 – said to be the most of any country in 
the world – but apparently technology assessment and payment systems  as part of the healthcare 
gatekeeping regime have not supported these same technologies through reimbursement decisions. Not 
one has been reimbursed or exported out of the country (Curtis, 2014). On the other hand, a precedent in 
attempts to ease this alignment and reduce the tension can now be found with Japan’s recent regulatory 
innovation, where the government has implemented a conditional approval system. Cell therapy 
developers are now only required to have a single, albeit larger, Phase 1 study to achieve marketing 
approval. (Interestingly, all the cell therapies currently approved in Japan, though small in number, are 
entitled to reimbursement, a converse of South Korea). 
 In considering the fundamental tension between market access and healthcare adoption gatekeeping, we 
can note that adaptive licensing and the early  access scheme in the UK, although legally and conceptually 
distinct in addressing licensing on the one hand, and adoption/access on the other, do align with each other 
in attempting to achieve  conditional forms of availability of innovative medicines in the two gatekeeping 
regimes. In a more global perspective, the analysis presented in this paper can usefully be set alongside 
analysis of cell therapy and other regenerative medicine gatekeeping developments in other parts of the 
world, which focus on inter-national variations and connections (Sleeboom-Faulkner, 2013), in order to 
further our understanding of competition in the global bioeconomy and collaborations that are interlacing 
through it.  
It is of interest to question the origins and forces influencing the proliferation of the novel, hybrid, flexible 
gatekeeping regimes reported here. Most obviously perhaps, does a political analysis pointing to the 
influence of the pharmaceutical industry hold water in explaining these trends? More specifically, does the 
long-established and ongoing analysis of regulatory capture (for example, Carpenter and Moss, 2014) 
provide a reasonable account of these developments? Although this paper has set out to describe 
gatekeeping modifications and their potential impacts, rather than the forces at work in their construction, 
some speculative, though inconclusive, remarks are in order.  As noted by Ehman et al (2013) cited in the 
introduction to this paper, regulators themselves acknowledge that their institutions and practices 
undertake not only gatekeeping roles but ‘facilitating’ roles vis-a-vis manufacturers and producers of new 
medical products. However, in the case of regenerative medicine, the participation of the multinational 
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pharmaceutical companies is in a very embryonic stage, and most of the activity lies with academic 
hospitals and small companies.  
Of course it is always the case that an industry would like harmonised regulation across different 
geographical jurisdictions such as the European Union and a ‘level playing field’ of regulatory demands with 
other innovators. In the UK, given the increasing calls for, and actions implementing, closer coordination 
between gatekeeping of market entry and gatekeeping of healthcare adoption and payment, the interests 
of manufacturers are encountering the forces of health technology assessment and cost effectiveness-
based planning ever more closely. Thus, while there is demonstrable proliferation of alternative gateways, 
these are limited in the access that they give to potential markets, and the mandated and legitimate power 
of HTA institutions such as NICE, with their deep commitment to utilitarian population health values, leads 
to a very constrained suite of apparent relaxative gateways, conditioned by constant re-appraisal of 
emerging clinical outcomes, formal evaluation of evidence, and potential withdrawal of conditional 
authorisations and reversal of conditional payment schemes. The extreme uncertainty of clinical outcomes 
for patient groups in many regenerative medicine developments doubtless underlies this picture of 
diversification and experimentalism in the gatekeeping regimes, rather than matching a template of 
regulatory capture.  
In a similar vein, the influence of patient organisations should be considered. It is certainly notable that 
many of the regenerative medicine products currently under development or in the marketplace concern 
rare diseases, and many of these have or seek ‘orphan’ status, which, while indicating relatively small 
potential patient populations clearly are seen to represent a business model for some companies which can 
offer a novel product for unmet needs at a viable, high price. Orphan status brings with it various fee 
waivers in the market regulation process and, if a marketed product finally results, gives the manufacturer 
a ten-year monopoly over its production (Hyry et al, 2015). Although a discourse of ‘early access for 
patients’ has become routine in the gatekeeping policy networks described here, this cannot be dismissed 
as purely rhetorical. As noted above for example, in the case of the UK’s implementation of the Early Access 
to Medicines scheme, patient involvement is explicitly promoted in this initiative. While it is impossible to 
clearly disentangle the respective influence of different stakeholders here, it is clear that patients’ interests, 
either directly or indirectly through advocates, is having some role in selectively shaping the direction of 
regenerative medicine gatekeeping developments. 
Conclusion 
This analysis has addressed the question of the extent to which and forms in which there are emerging 
flexibilities in existing and developing gatekeeping regimes applicable to regenerative medicine, and the 
extent to which such flexibilities might promote regenerative medicine products as a sector, in the UK and 
EU contexts.  I have developed the family of concepts of gatekeeping regimes and gateways from those of 
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regulatory regimes and regulatory connection in order to analyse how both regulatory and healthcare 
adoption policies taken together are being flexibly adapted to maintain what I have termed ‘gatekeeping 
connection’ with a high-profile emerging biomedical sector. In this nascent sector where conflicting interest 
dynamics are prominent, there is clear pressure to accelerate acceptance of products, seen in moves to 
overlap the domains of market regulation, health technology assessment and healthcare system planning in 
the hybrid gateways that I have analysed (Table 1). 
Should the flexibilities of special treatment being afforded to regenerative medicine that are considered in 
this paper be seen as fruitless gatekeeping after the cattle have already broken down the fences? In other 
words, are there now so many flexible exceptions and exemptions or alternative gateways being 
constructed around the dominant gatekeeping institutions and methodologies that the small but swelling 
tide of novel RM technologies is unstoppable and irreversible? I conclude that this is not the case. The 
extent of proliferation of flexibilities can too easily lead to an over-estimation of their significance. 
Although, as this paper shows, there are a number of diversifying, hybrid easings and relaxations of the 
prevailing centralist regimes (summarised in Table 1), and various exceptions and exemptions, their scope 
is somewhat limited, in spite of the few examples of early conditional authorisation and the like. And as 
noted, accelerated approval systems may not actually result in incentivisation and faster approval times 
(Boon et al, 2010) or more efficacious products (Davis and Abraham, 2013). This limited scope of exceptions 
and exemptions to dominant central regimes is defined by narrow criteria of rare disease, ‘orphan’ 
designation, critical but selective disease applications such as cancer, non-routine and thus restricted 
production runs, emergency or unmet need, and individual medical prescription.  
Returning, finally, to the conceptual developments explored in this paper.  Considering the notions of 
‘regulatory connection’ (Brownsword, 2008) and commensuration with existing gatekeeping regimes, aired 
in the introduction, I developed a family of concepts of ‘gatekeeping’, ‘gatekeeping regimes’ and ‘gateways’ 
as an apparatus that can help understand both market regulation and healthcare adoption passage-points 
with a single conceptual vocabulary, which is a novel approach and which enables an over-arching 
conceptualisation of the empirical trend of convergence of flexibilities into the hybrid forms that I have 
described. It is clear from my analysis that there is a ‘politics’ of gatekeeping connection and development 
of adoption gateways in the context of existing regimes, in which stakeholder interests interact and 
compete in various ways, at various levels and in different institutional sites.  The apparent adjustments, 
relaxations and resistances, and construction of alternate gateways in the gatekeeping regimes that I have 
reviewed, which appear to make obligatory passage points somewhat less universally obligatory in practice, 
show a complicated, mixed picture of the actual and potential emergence of regenerative medicine in face 
of existing institutional regimes, epistemologies and methodologies. The maintenance of gatekeeping 
connection is being developed through both resistances and relaxations, as a range of alternative gateways 
to the marketplace and to healthcare adoption appear, slowly and hesitantly, to be proliferatingi.  Given 
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this trend, further research should track the future directions and forms of gatekeeping regimes and 
gatekeeping connections that may develop, not least in the UK context of Britain’s impending departure 
from the European Union. Likewise, the effects of the gatekeeping regime’s exceptions and conditional 
contracts on producers’ innovation pathways, approved and adopted product volumes, and populations’ 
health impact require systematic evaluation.  
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Table 1. Dominant and flexible gatekeeping regimes  
Dominant gatekeeping 
regimes: 
 
Strict, Central, Legal 
EU Pharmaceutical directives 
ATMP/EMA-CAT Centralised; UK MHRA implementation and guidance;   
National Health Technology Assessment/NICE 
 
Flexible gateways  
 
 
Exceptions & 
exemptions: 
Less strict; 
multiple;alternative 
 
Legal/market regulatory 
gateways 
 
Hybrid gatekeeping: 
legal easing; broadening 
criteria 
 
Adoption gateways 
ATMP Hospital Exemption 
Adaptive licensing 
‘Specials’ license (UK only) 
Orphan designation 
Exceptional Circumstances 
Accelerated Assessment 
Medical device 
Early Access to Medicines 
Scheme (EAMS)/Promising 
Innovative Medicine (PIM) 
designation 
Adaptive pathways 
(MAPPS) 
Conditional approval  
Value-based assessment (if 
implemented) 
Commissioning through 
Evaluation 
NHS Executive specialised 
schemes 
Risk-sharing 
Multiple individual patient 
funding requests 
 
 
 
                                                          
i A current REGenableMED project (https://www.york.ac.uk/satsu/regenablemed/) aims to analyse  these dynamics in 
detail in the UK case to assess business models and the readiness of the UK health system for regenerative medicine 
as an economic, biomedical and healthcare enterprise. 
